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Abstract
This paper first describes in a relatively nontechnical fashion several econometric techniques that the authors
believe should be useful to industrial relations researchers. Those techniques are then applied to an analysis of
whether public sector impasse procedures create a "narcotic effect," that is, a tendency for the bargaining
parties, once they use the procedures, to become increasingly reliant on them in future negotiations. The
authors reanalyze data from Thomas Kochan and Joan Baderschneider’s study of the impasse experience of
police and firefighters under New York State’s Taylor Law during the 1968-76 period and find that while a
narcotic effect did exist, as Kochan and Baderschneider argued, that relationship lasted only during the early
years of the period and was actually reversed in later years. The authors conclude by explaining how such a
pattern of results could occur, tracing the implications of their findings for public policy, and suggesting; other
research questions that could be analyzed by the econometric methods they have described. (A comment by
Kochan and Baderschneider follows this article.)
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ESTIMATING THE NARCOTIC EFFECT:
CHOOSING TECHNIQUES THAT FIT THE PROBLEM
THOMAS A. KOCHAN and JEAN BADERSCHNEIDER*
This paper compares the Butler and Ehrenberg analysis of the narcotic
effects of impasse procedures, presented in the precedingarticle, with the pur-
poses, methods, and empirical results of the authors' earlier paper on the
same subject. The authors use the differences in the two papers to argue that a
need exists to achieve a better blending in industrial relations research of
model building and testing, of quantitative and qualitative data, and of sim-
ple and complex statistical tests. The differences in results presented in the
two papers are shown to reflect, in part, differences in the definition of the
problems examined. These authors stress the importance of choosing
statistical techniques that fit the theoretical and policy problems of interest to
industrial relations researchers and practitioners, and the power gained from
mixing qualitative and quantitative methods.
A FUNDAMENTAL problem for researchersin the fields of industrial relations and
labor economics is the selection of appro-
priate statistical techniques with which
to analyze a given body of data. Clearly, if
results vary according to the techniques
used, researchers must choose a method
of analysis only after they have developed
(1) an appreciation of the nature and defini-
tion of the underlying problem being stud-
ied, (2) a sound theory that provides the
conceptual guidance for deciding which
hypotheses to test, and (3) an understanding
*Thomas Kochan is a professor in the Industrial
Relations Section, Sloan School of Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Jean
Baderschneider is an assistant professor in the School of
Business, University of Kansas. They would like to
thank the following individuals for their helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper Katharine
Abraham, David Bloom, Henry Farber, Harry Katz,
Robert McKersie, and Joseph Shedd.
of the data available. This requires tho-
rough consideration of the institutional
and historical context of the substantive is-
sue being studied and transformation of
"raw" information provided by the in-
stitutional context into a set of theoretical
concepts, testable propositions, and empiri-
cal measures appropriate for the particular
body of data. Only then can appropriate
statistical techniques be fruitfully applied
Richard Butler and Ronald Ehrenberg have had the
opportunity to read and comment on earlier versions of
the Kochan-Baderschneider reply. While they still have
some substantive disagreements with Kochan and
Baderschneider, in particular over the latters' inter-
pretation of what is happening in the fixed-effects
model, they feel that devoting further space to these dis-
agreements would be unproductive and would detract
from the fact that the two sets of authors do agree on
many points. They believe that, read together, the two
papers complement each other and suggest important
improvements in research methodology in industrial
relations.-EDITOR
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and their results realistically interpreted.
The preceding paper by Richard J. Butler
and Ronald G. Ehrenberg (B 8 E) illustrates
the pitfalls of using a set of advanced sta-
tistical techniques without adequate con-
sideration of the substantive problem, the
theoretical model, or the data used in their
analysis.
B & E argue that a Bernoulli runs test and
a regression model that attempts to account
for both "observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity" are the most appropriate tech-
niques for analyzing whether or not a nar-
cotic effect is present in the patterns of usage
of impasse procedures. They argue further
that their application of these techniques
to data from New York State alters some of
the conclusions reached in our paper pub-
lished in this Review in 1978.1 In our discus-
sion we will argue that (1) a properly speci-
fied Bernoulli runs test may be better than
the conditional probability tests we used for
describing the patterns of dependence on
impasse procedures (although we were not
able to replicate their results), and (2) their
regression tests for unobserved hetero-
geneity lack a sound theoretical rationale
and produce misleading conclusions. On
the other hand, the B & E paper makes a
major contribution by highlighting the
theoretical ambiguity of the concept that
we and others have traditionally referred
to as the narcotic effect. B 8 E also show that
a fixed-effects model can be a useful supple-
ment to ordinary least squares regression
techniques and that it should be used when
the assumptions of the test fit the substan-
tive industrial relations problem. Unfor-
tunately, they chose a poor example and set
of data to make their point.
We hope that nothing contained in this
discussion discourages specialists in in-
dustrial relations, economics, or the be-
havioral sciences from applying the ad-
vances of model building and statistical
testing to important industrial relations
problems. Instead, we hope that this dis-
cussion serves to stimulate critical evalua-
'Thomas A. Kochan and Jean Baderschneider,
"Dependence on Impasse Procedures: Police and
Firefighters in New York State," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July 1978), pp.
431-49.
tion and selective use of advanced tech-
niques. As we have argued elsewhere, pro-
gress on problems in our field can best be
served by mixing quantitative and qualita-
tive methods to develop and test theories
that are well grounded in an understanding
of the essence of the problem at hand.'
The Purpose of Our Original Paper
Before taking up the empirical and
methodological issues raised by B c E, we
need to emphasize that the purpose of the
original paper was to present and test a the-
ory of the determinants of impasses and to
use that theory to test for the effects of the
change in the Taylor Law from factfinding
to arbitration on the rate of impasses that
occurred under that law. This was clearly
stated in our paper:
Since impasses can be caused by a wide array of
factors in addition to the nature of the impasse
procedure, these other causes must be controlled
before the effects of the procedures can be es-
timated. A theory that identifies these other
causal forces must therefore be developed, and
since the effects of a procedure may change over
time, any specific estimates of the effects of a
procedure must be placed in their historical con-
text. This paper will present a theory of impasses
in public employee bargaining and use it to es-
timate the effects of a change in impasse
procedures for police and firefighters in the state
of New York. 3
We were concerned with assessing the
narcotic effect only in the first part of our
paper, where we attempted to show why it
was important to develop a theory of im-
passes in order to place the empirical analy-
sis of the change in the law in its proper
theoretical and historical context. 4 The
2For a summary of the overall project, its results,
and its policy recommendations, see Thomas A.
Kochan, Mordehai Mironi, Ronald G. Ehrenberg,
Jean Baderschneider, and Todd Jick, Dispute Resolu-
tion Under Fact-Finding and Arbitration: An Empiri-
cal Analysis, (New York: The American Arbitration
Association, 1979), pp. 177-82.
3Kochan and Baderschneider, "Dependence on
Impasse Procedures," p. 432.
'In fact, the original title of the manuscript we sub-
mitted to the Review was: "Determinants of Collective
Bargaining Impasses: Theoretical and Policy Analy-
sis." The editor and a referee suggested we change the
title to capture the issue of the narcotic effect. We
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regression analysis that followed did not in-
corporate a test for the narcotic effect be-
cause we do not see the narcotic effect as a
useful theoretical explanation for why
some units are more dependent on pro-
cedures than others.
The purpose of our paper and our use of
the term narcotic effect are repeated here to
point out the fundamental difference be-
tween the way we used this term and the way
it is used in the B & E paper. In contrast to
our broad use of the term for describing the
overall trends in impasse usage across units
and over several rounds of bargaining, they
interpret the term in a more strict fashion
and seek to sort out a "true narcotic effect"
-that increase in the probability of going
to impasse that occurs because a unit went
to impasse in the past, net of the other fac-
tors (such as heterogeneity) that influence
the probability of an impasse. We will show
that the difference in definition and use of
this term explains part, but not all, of the
differences in the results obtained and the
conclusions drawn from our respective
analyses. We should also note that by intro-
ducing this term in our paper as it has tradi-
tionally been defined in the literature, we
may have perpetuated its conceptual am-
biguity and thereby led B & E to seek a more
precise operational definition and statis-
tical test for its presence.
Differences in Empirical Analyses
and Results
Our empirical analysis started with a
general overview of the impasse histories of
police and firefighters in New York State.
The descriptive data clearly showed that the
rate of usage of the impasse procedure had
increased over each successive round of bar-
gaining under the Taylor Law between 1968
and 1975. Specifically, the percentages of
units going to impasse across the first five
rounds were, in order, 41, 47, 59, 61, and 65
percent. We also reported that the largest
cities were the heaviest users. For example,
the largest city in our sample, Buffalo, went
compromised by using the term "Dependence on
Impasse Procedures."
to impasse 100 percent of the time it bar-
gained with police and firefighters, and
the five largest cities in the sample-Buf-
falo, Yonkers, Rochester, Syracuse, and
Albany-together went to impasse in 90
percent of their police and fire negotiations
during this period and to factfinding or be-
yond in 70 percent. In contrast, 15 percent of
the police units and 8 percent of the fire-
fighter units in the state never used the
procedures over the rounds of bargaining
during this period.
It was that overall pattern of usage that
we sought to describe more precisely with
the conditional probability tests presented
in our paper. Any redefinition of the nar-
cotic effect that requires the exclusion of the
information drawn from those units that
always or never went to impasse, or limits
the information drawn from those units,
produces a misleading description of this
impasse history. Yet this is essentially what
happens in the B 8c E Bernoulli and regres-
sion tests.
The B & E Empirical Tests
B c E use two sets of empirical tests to
assess whether a narcotic effect was present:
a Bernoulli runs test and a fixed effects
regression model that controls for both
"observed" heterogeneity (that portion of
the variation in the probability of using a
procedure that is accounted for by the theory
and the variables measured in our model)
and "unobserved" heterogeneity that is
constant over the rounds of bargaining ex-
amined and unique to each bargaining re-
lationship included in the analysis. The
latter test is presented as the most appro-
priate technique in this context, and there-
fore we will concentrate most of our dis-
cussion on that test and will only touch
briefly on the Bernoulli test.
The Bernoulli runs test. To test for a
narcotic effect we applied a conditional
probability test to the first five rounds of
bargaining. B 8c E, in contrast, applied a
runs test to two sets of data: the first three
and then the last three rounds of bargaining
included in our impasse history profiles.
Their last three rounds generally span the
time period from 1970 to 1974 and include
some observations under factfinding and
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Table. Replication of the Runs Test with Complete Set of Observations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
B & E K &B B&E K &B
000 25 20
001 13 17 13.33 1 3 2 1
010 13 11 13.33 2 2 2 2
100 14 11 13.33 3 1 1 2
011 7 10 13.67 1 3 3 3
101 11 19 13.67 2 2 2 1
110 23 11 13.67 3 1 1 2
111 16 37
where:
(1) Pattern (010, for example, indicates that impasse occurred only in round 2.)
(2) Actual number of times that pattern occurred using B & E subsample and K & B sample.
(3) Expected number of times that pattern would occur if a simple Bernoulli process were present.
(4) Expected rank in the group if a positive narcotic effect existed.
(5) Expected rank in the group if a negative narcotic effect existed.
(6) Actual rank in the group for B & E subsample and K & B sample.
some under arbitration.5 Their tests showed
that a positive narcotic effect existed in the
first three rounds and a negative narcotic
effect was present in the latter three. From
this they conclude that their results contra-
dict ours. However, examine carefully what
we reported in our article based on our con-
ditional probability tests:
The results shown in Table 2 indicate that the
probability of going to impasse increased in sub-
sequent rounds of bargaining for those units that
had previously gone to impasse. Only in the sec-
ond and third rounds of negotiations, however,
was the difference in the probability of going to
impasse significantly greater for those units that
5The impasse history profiles should not be con-
fused with the data used in our regressions to test for
the effects of the change in the law nor in the B c E
regressions used to test for a narcotic effect. These
historical profiles were collected from the records of
the Public Employment Relations Board and verified
in our first set of field interviews with the parties. They
do not attempt to mirror the data on the stage of settle-
ment for the last round of bargaining under fact-
finding and the first round under arbitration since not
all of the units had negotiated a first contract under
arbitration when the profiles were collected and some
of the units did not complete their first negotiations
under arbitration during the time period available to
our study. Thus, the profiles contain a slightly larger
number of bargaining units than were available for
our regressions under arbitration.
went to impasse in prior rounds . . . . By the
fourth and fifth rounds, the increasing usage of
the procedures was more a general phenomenon
than a function of the specific bargaining unit's
impasse experience.
6
Thus, our results from the conditional
probability test are similar to B & E's results
using the runs test for the first three rounds
of bargaining. A positive and significant
narcotic effect existed in rounds two and
three.
There is, however, a difference in the find-
ings for the three later rounds. We stated
that the rate of usage continued to be higher
for earlier users but that the difference was
not significant because new units were also
beginning to use the procedure. B 8c E state
that a negative narcotic effect was present in
the later rounds. A major reason for this con-
flict in findings is the difference between the
studies in their definition of the narcotic
effect: B & E exclude from their runs test all
units that either used the procedures each
time or never used the procedure, whereas
we include these units in our conditional
probability tests.
A second reason for the difference in re-
6Kochan and Baderschneider, "Dependence on
Impasse Procedures," p. 438.
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sults is that we also differ over other decision
rules for defining the sample used in the
runs tests. The table shows the results of our
effort to replicate B & E's runs tests on the
cases included in our original analysis. Our
results, using their methodology, show a
larger number of impasses in the "last"
round and do not display a pattern that is
consistent with what B & E argue would be
a negative narcotic effect. Our replication of
their test, and our original conditional
probability tests, used all of the units in the
sample for which impasse history data were
collected and verified during our first field
interviews with the parties. B & E excluded
several of these units from their runs test,
some because of the difference in their defi-
nition of the narcotic effect and others for
other reasons we do not find persuasive.
7
Regardless of these differences in defini-
tion and empirical results, two things
should be noted here. First, a runs test is
superior to the conditional probability test
for describing these data because it provides
more detailed information concerning the
patterns of impasses and forces the re-
searcher to specify more precisely what type
of pattern would indicate support for a
positive, negative, or no narcotic effect. In
this sense B & E's test is an improvement
over ours, even though we believe the con-
stant users and settlers should not be ex-
cluded and the complete set of observations
should be used. Second, neither their test nor
ours explains why these patterns occur be-
cause the causes of variations in dependence
7B & E deleted cases from the sample analyzed in our
original analysis if any one of the following occurred:
(1) no contract was negotiated in 1975 or 1976 because
the parties were in the midst of a multiyear agreement
or had not settled their contract by June 1976 when
data collection was terminated, (2) no contract was
negotiated in 1968 or 1969, (3) the parties signed a
three-year contract during the 1968- 76 period so that
there were two consecutive years during which no
bargaining occurred, or (4) a contract reopener rather
than a full successor agreement was negotiated. The
contract reopeners were excluded because the code
book we gave to B &e E did not correctly show a code
for reopeners; they deleted five cases because of this
error. We believe the first three rules are also inap-
propriate, since they eliminated a number of units
with negotiation and impasse histories that are as
relevant to the analysis as the histories of those units
included.
on the procedures are uncontrolled. To
provide such control, one needs a theory
of impasses and some type of multivariate
analysis.
The B & E regression tests. As stated in our
first paper, the purposes of our regression
equations were: (1) to test the theoretical
propositions advanced for explaining varia-
tions in the probability of an impasse occur-
ring and (2) to test for the effects of the
change in the law from factfinding to arbi-
tration on the probability of an impasse.
Therefore, when B & E state that "K &c B
did not actually test for the presence of nar-
cotic effects with the regression estimates
they presented in their paper," their com-
ment is correct but pointless, since this was
not the purpose of these estimates. There-
fore, our discussion will focus on the inter-
esting and important research question
their analysis raises, namely, how well does
the fixed effects model fit this problem and
these data?
The fixed effects model attempts to test
whether our theoretical model omitted some
characteristic that is fixed over the time
period of the last three rounds of bargaining
under factfinding and the first round of
bargaining under arbitration and that is
correlated with one or more of the variables
included in our model. B & E do not offer any
a priori hypothesis for what this phantom
effect might be or the reason that this type
of effect is more theoretically plausible
than some other type of omitted character-
istic (such as one that is not fixed over time
but is also correlated with an included vari-
able). We will not, however, engage in a
debate over whether or not such a variable
was omitted from our model. Undoubtedly
there are a number of determinants of im-
passes that our theory missed and there are
others that we captured in our theory but
that are measured imperfectly.
No social science model ever claims to
capture or perfectly measure all causal
variables. The relevant question, then, is
whether one should test for a fixed effect in
the absence of a theoretical rationale as a
check on the completeness of a model that
offered an explicit rationale for the variables
included. There is no "correct" answer to
this question since one's choice depends
HeinOnline  -- 35 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 25 1981-1982
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largely on how much confidence one has in
the theoretical model and how much addi-
tional potential for error is added to the
analysis by conducting the more complex
statistical test. In this case, for example,
testing for the fixed effect requires B & E to
add lagged measures of the dependent vari-
able (impasse experience) to the right-hand
side of the equation and, in some cases, as
many as fifty dummy variables (one for each
city) to their equations. Obviously, these are
not costless procedures, for they have a po-
tential for muddling the effects of the vari-
ables included in the equation originally for
their theoretical and policy relevance. Our
preference, given the limitations of the
sample size and of the measures available,
would be to demand a stronger theoretical
rationale than B & E provide for complicat-
ing the equation in this way. Clearly, how-
ever, this is a judgement over which re-
searchers can reasonably disagree. Thus, let
us examine more specifically what happens
when this model is tested on these data.
B & E used two techniques to attempt to
disentangle the narcotic effect from the fixed
effect. The first is a complex instrumental
variable model using first differences. The
second uses the more conventional dummy
variable technique: essentially a dummy
variable is included for each city to capture
the unique within-city fixed effects. Both
procedures produce negative and signifi-
cant coefficients on the lagged impasse
variables that are included to capture what-
ever narcotic effect is left over after the fixed
effects are partialled out. This negative
result surprises us, given our knowledge of
the general rise in impasse rates that oc-
curred across these rounds and the knowl-
edge that the heaviest users, such as Buffalo
and Syracuse, tended to keep going to im-
passe over these rounds of bargaining.8
8Note that based on the regression results discussed
in our paper, we would not have been surprised by an
insignificant effect for the lagged impasse variables,
since we also found that new units began to go to
impasse during this time period. Also, when we added
a measure of the percentage of times the units went to
impasse in previous rounds, the coefficient was gen-
erally not significant. We chose not to dwell heavily
on this finding, however, since we were concerned
about the potential confusion that could result in
The key to explaining that finding by
B & E is again to be found in the lack of effect
that the constant users and constant settlers
have on their coefficients. In the case of
constant use across these rounds, yt-i,
yt -2, and yt -3 all take on the value of one.
Similarly, in the case of constant settlement
without impasse across these rounds, yt-i,
yt-2, and yt-3 all take on the value of
zero. In either case the first-difference terms
always take a value of zero. Therefore, the
lagged-impasse variables that B & E use
to test for the narcotic effect are perfectly col-
linear with the fixed-effects terms for these
observations. Thus, there is no way to deter-
mine if the effects of the constant users or
constant settlers are captured in the previ-
ous-impasse variables or in the fixed-effects
term. At best, any information gained from
the constant users and constant settlers is
spurious.9
In short, one cannot conclude from B 8c E's
equations that a negative narcotic effect was
present across the entire range of units in
the sample. The fact that they get the same
results when they delete constant users and
settlers from their regressions reinforces
our view that their equations are driven not
by all the units but only by those that
changed their behavior across the rounds
examined.
The bottom line of all this is that part of
B & E's evidence for the narcotic effect as
traditionally defined, and as we used it in the
first part of our original paper, is measured
by what B 8c E call fixed effects due to unob-
served heterogeneity. What all this suggests
adding measures of lagged dependent variables to the
equation.
9Along with the collinearity problem there is an-
other technical reason why no useful information is
gained in these regressions from the constant users or
the constant settlers. The preferred specification for
this type of zero-one dependent variable would be a
logit model rather than an ordinary least squares
model. If the logit model had been used in the B & E
equation, the coefficients on those observations that
are perfectly collinear with both the dependent vari-
able and the lagged impasse variables would attempt
to go to infinity and the program would not work.
Thus, whatever results were obtained from these obser-
vations in the ordinary least squares equation would
not have been obtainable had the more technically
preferred model been used.
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is that the difference between their findings
and ours again comes down to a definition
of narcotic effect. A broad definition, and
the one that generally fits the popular usage
of the term in collective bargaining, is "re-
peated or heavy reliance on an impasse
procedure." Those using this definition
make no effort to disentangle variations
in the initial probability of using the pro-
cedure from variations in the probability of
using the procedure later. A stricter and
narrower definition of the narcotic effect,
and one that is tested implicitly in the B & E
regressions, is "the portion of a unit's reli-
ance on impasse procedures that is solely
due to the unit's having once used the pro-
cedure in the past." That definition ex-
cludes that portion of a unit's reliance re-
sulting from variations in the "natural"
tendency of bargaining units to go to im-
passe regardless of the nature of the proce-
dure. That narrow definition also implies
that it may be incorrect to view Buffalo, for
example, as addicted to impasse procedures,
even though Buffalo used the procedures
each time, because the city and its unions
may simply be impasse-prone due to "un-
observed heterogeneity." In contrast, we
would (and did) explain the fact that Buffalo
is a heavy user by noting that Buffalo scores
high on most of the critical variables con-
tained in our model of the causes of im-
passes.
While the B & E definition may be more
technically precise, given the way econo-
mists analyze the problem of "state depend-
ence versus heterogeneity," its use changes
the substantive and theoretical problem of
greatest concern to us and to policy makers.
Thus, in the course of their analysis, B & E
inadvertently changed the substantive prob-
lem in a way that loses sight of the under-
lying theoretical and policy problem that we
addressed. They end up addressing the ques-
tion, "Does going to impasse per se increase
the probability of usage of the procedure in
the future?" That question is also of poten-
tial interest to policy makers, but attempt-
ing to answer it as B & E do produces mis-
leading conclusions because those observa-
tions of greatest concern to policy makers
(those units that were repeated users) are
excluded from their analysis. By discount-
ing the effects of observations at both tails
of the distribution of responses on the de-
pendent variable, B & E's technique also
limits the power of the regression model to
test the propositions included in the theory
for explaining the causes of variations in
dependence on the procedure. Finally, this
data restriction makes it inappropriate for
B & E to extrapolate the results obtained in
their regressions to the entire range of ob-
servations in this sample or in future sam-
ples, as they do in their concluding section
when they discuss potential theoretical
arguments for the reasons a negative nar-
cotic effect might occur.
Implications for Research
Now that we have explained why the two
studies obtained different results and have
shown that the B & E results do not alter any
of our substantive findings or conclusions,
let us return to the larger question of which
approach offers a better model for industrial
relations research. Our answer is that a com-
bination of both approaches is needed. B 8c E
demonstrate the potential applicability of
the fixed effects regression model and there-
by show that under the correct conditions
this model can and should be used to test for
the robustness of ordinary least squares
regression results in studies that employ a
combination of time-series and cross-sec-
tional data. They further illustrate how the
term "narcotic effect" is misleading as a
theoretical explanation of an observed
heavy pattern of dependence on impasse
procedures. We believe, however, that the
fundamental question of why some units
use procedures more than others cannot be
explained outside of an explicit theory that
states and then measures the underlying
causal forces. To rely on an equation that
"explains" current use of impasse proce-
dures with measures of previous use plus a
set of dummy variables for each city in the
sample begs the question and muddles the
impact of the theoretical and policy-rele-
vant variables already included in our
model.10
10Examine, for example, how the coefficients on the
explanatory variables contained in our model and used
as the x variables in the B & E regressions change as
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Finally, we believe that much of the con-
fusion introduced by B & E would have been
avoided if they had given more weight to the
simple descriptive trends in our data and
had tested their quantitative results against
the larger set of quantitative and qualita-
tive data obtained in our field interviews
with the parties involved in these negotia-
tions. As we noted, the results reported in the
original paper were only one part of a much
broader project." The data were obtained
through personal interviews with the labor,
management, and neutral representatives
involved in these negotiations. We followed
the evolution of the change in the law for a
two and one half year period and used retro-
spective interviews and impasse history
data to place those current experiences in
perspective.' 2 The quantitative results re-
ported in the paper and in other contexts
were constantly subjected, first, to our own
critiques of whether they were consistent
they experiment with different models that include
lagged impasse usage, instrumental variables, first-
difference terms, and fixed or random effects terms.
Note also that B & E pay almost no attention to these
changes in discussing their results. Their primary
interest is not in the adequacy or stability of the theo-
retical explanation but in the phantom effects that are
omitted from the theory.
"Kochan, Mironi, Ehrenberg, Baderschneider, and
Jick, Dispute Resolution Under Fact-Finding and
Arbitration: An Empirical Analysis.
12The time period for the study was dictated by our
commitment to the Public Employment Relations
Board, and to the labor and management representa-
tives who assisted in the data collection, to prepare a
report summarizing our findings, conclusions, and
recommendations in time for them to use (or abuse)
the results in the legislative debate over whether or not
to extend, modify, or repeal the arbitration provisions
in the law that were due to expire in 1977.
with the qualitative data and "insights"
obtained in the interviews, second, to com-
parisons with data independently collected
by the Public Employment Relations Board,
and, finally, to the critical eyes of the parties
themselves. 3 Had our regression analyses
produced the surprising finding that a
strong "negative narcotic effect" existed
over this time period in the cities we visited,
we would have had a problem of reconciling
that result with our interview data and with
the basic descriptive statistics collected
earlier in the project.
Not all industrial relations research prob-
lems can be addressed through a mix of
theory construction, direct data collection
from the field, qualitative and quantitative
analysis, and direct feedback to the parties.
Yet we are fearful that in the absence of this
type of close interaction across problem and
setting, theory, data, analysis, and report-
ing, researchers can easily focus on tangents
that are of limited relevance to either prac-
tical events or public policy development
and end up choosing statistical techniques
that lose sight of the key theoretical and
policy problems. If the latter strategy pre-
vails, we will get less of the scientific and
public policy advancement that both we and
Professors Butler and Ehrenberg are in
search of and more of what someone reading
this reanalysis of our data described as
'mystical empiricism."
'
3The Public Employment Relations Board held a
symposium to discuss the results of the research and to
hear the views of labor and management and state
officials on the arbitration amendment. See Sympos-
ium on Police and Firefighter Arbitration in New
York State (Albany, New York: The Public Employ-
ment Relations Board, 1977).
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